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Abstract
The paper describes some special aspects of the security infrastructure for distributed com-
puting systems. Most heterogeneous and geographically dispersed distributed computing sys-
tems, e.g. GRID, use the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). One of the main problem in such
systems is the necessity to use time-limited proxy certiﬁcates for delegation of rights from user
to an execution remote service which acts on behalf of the user. The problem is that there
exists a contradiction between the limited lifetime of the proxy certiﬁcates and unpredictable
time of the request processing. Our approach allows to avoid using the proxy certiﬁcates. This
makes the security infrastructure of distributed computing systems simpler for development,
support and use. In particular, the proxy renewal service becomes unnecessary at all.
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1 Introduction
The development of the modern Web technology and computers sets a crucial task of building
heterogeneous and geographically dispersed distributed computing systems (DCS), e.g. GRIDs,
which provide users with diﬀerent computing resources by means of a uniﬁed interface. The
advantage of DCS is the simpliﬁcation of an access to clouds, supercomputers, databases and,
as consequence, growth of eﬃciency of scientiﬁc research and engineering developments in aero-
and hydrodynamics, laser and atomic industry and in many other areas.
However, using the Web technologies for heterogeneous and geographically dispersed DCS
requires more sophisticated and robust solutions for various aspects of the distributed compu-
tation in comparison with the case of local resources or more localized DCS. In particular there
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Figure 1: General scheme of the DCS
are speciﬁc aspects of a security model for such DCS. The paper describes some special aspects
of the security infrastructure of such DCS and possible improvements of them. Mostly we will
consider the GRID computing as a reference DCS model for implementation of the security
infrastructure.
There are the two main problems which must be resolved by the DCS security infrastructure.
One problem is a security of communications and another is a delegation of authority from one
service to others during processing of user requests. The ﬁrst problem is solved by encrypting
communication channels. In the present paper we do not consider this problem and concentrate
on another problem mentioned above.
For the purpose of this paper we will consider DCS as a set of interacting Web services
which send requests to each other. Access points for such a system are user Web interfaces or
command line interfaces installed on PCs. For example, the typical structure of DCS [1] [2] is
presented in ﬁgure 1.
Providing the security of DCS implies solving the following basic problems:
1. Authentication. This means conﬁrmation of the truth of an attribute of a single piece of
data claimed true by an entity.
2. Authorization. This means the granting of access rights according to a policy. For exam-
ple, each virtual organization(VO) in GRID has certain policy for resource access.
3. Delegation. This means delegation of rights from a user or a Web service to an executing
Web service.
In this paper we will consider the last aspect of the DCS security by using GRID systems as an
example. However the same problems are relevant and the suggested solutions are applicable
for any DCS which comprises a set of communicating Web services.
One of the most successful and the biggest DCS is the European GRID infrastructure EGI
[3] which is based on the gLite middleware [4, 5]. The main part of the European GRID is the
Worldwide LHC Computing GRID (WLCG) [6] which is used for processing and simulation of
experimental data from the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) [7]. The fantastic result of the LHC
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experiments is the discovery of Higgs boson [8] which could not be reached without the WLCG
[9].
The security infrastructure of the WLCG is based on the PKI [10] and X.509 certiﬁcates
[11]. A user signs a request to the WLCG by a self signed secondary certiﬁcated, namely by
the proxy certiﬁcate. For security reasons the proxy certiﬁcate has short life time in opposite
to the user certiﬁcate which is valid for about one year. The GRID peculiarity is unpredictable
time of a request execution because the system contains a number of queues where the request
may turn out in a pending state. Thus proxy certiﬁcate may expire and this causes request
execution failure. To prevent such a situation, the MyProxy [?] service is installed to renew
proxy certiﬁcates if necessary.
The necessity to use the MyProxy service signiﬁcantly complicates the security infrastruc-
ture. First, it is necessary to use additional service. Secondly, users have to generate proxy
certiﬁcates and load them into the MyProxy. Thirdly, the renew procedure is not a simple one.
All of these points creates a lot of diﬃculties for developers, system administrators and users.
The main idea of the proposed approach is to omit using the proxy certiﬁcates in security
infrastructures at all. Roughly speaking, in our scheme each issued request is a pair of a message
and individual hash related to it. This single-shot hash has unlimited lifetime. Consequently,
in the new scheme, such service as MyProxy is not needed.
We would like to emphasize that the unlimited lifetime of the hash is compensated by the
fact that it can be used only once and only for a speciﬁc query. Thus hash compromise can
only result in the fact that the request can be processed again. It is not too much to pay for
the improvements that our approach will provide.
Although the examples are given in the context of GRIDs, our suggestion is applicable to
any DCS that can be considered as a set of interconnected Web services..
There are several approaches for addressing problems associated with short lifetime of proxy
certiﬁcates. In the papers [12] [13] the authors focused on simplifying user’s interaction with the
MyProxy service by placing long-lived proxy into MyProxy service and use it to automatically
generate short-lived proxy. However this approach does not solve the complexities of managing
X.509-based certiﬁcates and command-line tools.
The approach based on the Kerberos tickets is used in the Kerberized Certiﬁcate Authority
[14]. This system is built on the top of the Kerberos. It uses the tickets to generate a proxy
certiﬁcate on the ﬂy using the information on the credentials contained in the ticket. In our
approach, we propose to completely refuse the proxy certiﬁcates.
Thus the analysis shows that the proposed approach should give essential advantage for
GRID-like systems with heterogeneous resources including data storages, supercomputers,
clouds, etc.
In the next section we will consider the general structure of the security infrastructure for
DCS and present criticism of solutions currently used. In the section 3 the detailed conception
of the solution without proxy certiﬁcates is presented. In Conclusion the obtained results are
listed and possible future investigations are described in brief.
2 DCS security infrastructure
The general principles of the modern approach to building a GRID system is well described
in [15] on the example of the Globus toolkit, version 4 [16]. The security infrastructure is
build around PKI that uses asymmetric cryptography. One of the main problem of the security
infrastructure is the problem of delegation of rights [17].
Let us consider the delegation procedure in DCS for the following taskﬂow (see ﬁg. 2):
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• A Client asks a Service1 to perform a request.
• The Service1 sends a subrequest to Service2.
Client Service1 Service2
request
delegation
subrequest
Figure 2: Delegation of credentials
It is expected that the Client somehow delegates its rights to Service1 to authenticate it to
the Service2 since subrequest is performed on his behalf. Therefore there are a question how
this delegation is is carried out.
The common solution used in GRID is to use the proxy certiﬁcate with noncritical extension
such as VOMS (Virtual Organization Management Service [?]) extension to store information
about user rights. The proxy certiﬁcate is an extended X.509 public key certiﬁcate and has the
following properties:
• The proxy certiﬁcate is signed with standard X.509 of user which requires delegation of
rights or another proxy certiﬁcate;
• The proxy certiﬁcate contains both public and private keys; these are not the original
users keys but generated from them;
• The proxy certiﬁcate needs no password (unlike usual PKI certiﬁcates);
• The proxy certiﬁcate cannot be revoked;
• The proxy certiﬁcates are used by GRID services, to act on behalf of the proxy issuer.
Thus the proxy certiﬁcates are essentially less secure objects than standard certiﬁcates. To
reduce the chance for proxy certiﬁcate to be stolen, the proxy must have very short lifetime.
This leads to the problem of the renovation of the proxy. The possible solution of the problem
is to use certain service that have to manage proxy certiﬁcates and renew them if necessary.
One of such service is the MyProxy service.
In a common context of task execution in GRID [18] delegation and renewal process in GRID
is shown in ﬁgure 3. Here ’User interface’, ’WM service’ and ’Execution service’ correspond to
Client, Service1, Service2 in ﬁgure 2.
3 Security infrastructure without proxy certiﬁcates
Let us consider a set of entities (services or users) which interact with each other. All these
entities could be divided into two classes:
• Services and users which produce requests on behalf of themselves;
• Services which produce requests on behalf of other entities.
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Figure 3: Renewal proxy procedure
In context of tasks execution in GRIDs, entities of ﬁrst type are users or services which play a
role of access points to DCS. The entities of second class are generally execution or data storage
services. We also assume that all services are registered in an VS (Validation Service). This
means that all requests from unknown services will be rejected.
The proposed architecture of the DCS security infrastructure is shown in ﬁgure 4.
Each request processed in DCS is accompanied by an accounting information. Accounting
information is a triple of the following objects:
ac = {h,Entirys, Entityd}, F IXME
where h, Entitys, Entityd are the hash, source and destination entity of request. The triple
ac means that the entity Entitys sends a request with the hash h to the entity Entityd for
execution. Complete format of accounting information include some additional objects such as
aﬃliation to a virtual organization and user’s roles in it.
Let us consider the processing of a request from the point of view of the credential delegation.
1. The Client generate a request r1 and the hash h1 = H(r1).
2. The Client registers the triple {h1, Client, Service1} in the VS.
3. The Client sends the request r1 to the Service1 for processing.
4. The Service1 generates the hash from the obtained request r1 and asks the VS to approve
it. If VS approves then Service1 continues.
5. The Service1 generates the new subrequest r2 that is generated from r1 and the hash
h2 = H(r2).
6. The Service1 registers the triple {h2, Service1, Service2} in the VS.
7. The Service1 sends the request to the Service2 for further processing.
8. The Service2 generates the hash from the obtained request r2 and asks the VS to approve
it. If VS approves then Service2 continues.
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Figure 4: New architecture of security infrastructure of DCS. See details in the text.
Table 1: Comparision of standard and new approaches
Features With proxy New approach
Transfer both public and private keys YES NO
Password protection NO NO
Revocation NO YES
Acts on behalf of a user YES YES
Credential lifetime very short unlimited
In processing the request, the validation service accumulates chains of accounting infor-
mation for each request in the DCS. This information can be used for diﬀerent purposes. In
particular, it may be used for revocation of the request at any stage of processing.
In the table 1 we compare standard approach based on proxy certiﬁcates and the proposed
approach. The table shows that the new approach has several advantages over the old approach.
For example, the new approach allows to revoke the request at any stage of processing. The
disadvantage of this approach is the need to generate a separate hash for each request.
4 Conclusion
In this brief article we present a new approach to building the security infrastructure of DCS
without the use of the proxy certiﬁcates with short lifetime. This approach allows to eliminate
the use of credential management service such as MyProxy to simplify the development of DCS,
its installation and support and, ﬁnally, interaction of users with the systems. The disadvantage
of this approach is the need to generate a separate hash for each request.
Further development of this approach involves improving the revocation procedure.
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